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JAPAN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION: WEAKER AND LESS

EFFECTIVE THAN THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
David L. Heifetz
Abstract: In November 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention"). The
preamble of the OECD Convention states that "bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions, ... which raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts international
competitive conditions." All member countries signed the OECD Convention and thus
were committed to implement it via the passage of domestic legislation by December 31,
1999. The Japanese promulgated new anti-bribery provisions to satisfy the mandates of
the OECD Convention. However, when compared to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, the new Japanese provisions continue to put U.S. companies at a disadvantage when
competing with Japanese companies in foreign markets. Additionally, the Japanese
legislative efforts to date are not in keeping with the spirit of the OECD Convention and
are probably insufficient to meet the Convention's standards.

I.

INTRODUCTION

1
When Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")
on December 19, 1977, the United States became the first country in the
world to criminalize the bribing of foreign officials. 2 Prior to the passage of
the FCPA, the practice of bribing foreign officials by American companies
was widespread and commonplace. Just before the passage of the FCPA, a
voluntary disclosure program initiated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission showed that as many as 600 American firms had made
payments to foreign officials. 3 These payments were substantial: 4 Lockheed
alone had spent more than $22 million. American companies were not
alone in this practice-it was the normal way international business was

2

15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (1999).
Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus For Worldwide

Chanqes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486 (2000).
Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,
32 STAN. J INT'L L. 121, 123 (1996).
4 Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? The OECD
Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1249, 1256
(1999).
s Klich, supra note 3, at 123.
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conducted. 6 The passage of the FCPA put American companies at a
significant disadvantage when competing with other companies from
countries 7 that allow, and in some cases encourage, bribery of foreign
officials.

In November 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD
Convention" or "Convention"). 8 The preamble of the OECD Convention
states that "bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business
transactions,

.

.

.

which raises serious moral and political concerns,

undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts
international competitive conditions." 9 All member countries l° signed the
OECD Convention and thus were committed to implement it via the passage
of domestic legislation by December 31, 1999." The resulting promulgation
of domestic anti-bribery laws evidence some level of international support
for the idea that bribery of foreign public officials is not acceptable.
This Comment examines the new Japanese anti-bribery provisions
promulgated to satisfy the mandates of the OECD Convention from the
perspective of the United States. Specifically, it appraises the OECD
Convention's mandatory provisions, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA"), and the September 1998 amendments to the Japanese Unfair
Competition Prevention Law ("UCPL"). It then discusses whether Japanese
and American companies will now be on equal footing when competing for
business in other countries. This Comment argues that the new Japanese
legislation is a weaker deterrent from bribery of foreign officials than the
U.S. FCPA, and that it will likely prove insufficient to meet the requirements
of the OECD Convention in its current form.
See infra Part IV.
A number of European countries encouraged the bribing of foreigners by making such payments
tax deductible as business expenses. While not required under the OECD Convention, the vast majority of
countries have ceased this practice since its passage. See the OECD website for more information on this
issue, at http://www.oecd.org.
George, supra note 2, at 500.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Nov. 1997, pmbl., http://www.oecd.org/ [hereinafter OECD Convention].
' Current membership of the OECD (in alphabetical order, followed by date of membership):
Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark
(1961), Finland (1969), France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961),
Ireland (1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), The
Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Slovak
Republic (2000), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom
(1961), and United States (1961). OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
11 George, supra note 2, at 500.
6

7
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Part II provides general background of the OECD Convention. Part
III examines the substance of the OECD Convention as adopted. Part IV
explores the U.S. FCPA and contrasts it with the OECD Convention as
adopted. Part V examines the recent amendments to the Japanese Unfair
Competition Prevention Law, which includes the offense of bribing foreign
public officials, and compares these provisions with the U.S. FCPA.
Finally, Part VI concludes that not only are U.S. companies at a
disadvantage when competing with Japanese companies in foreign markets,
but also that the Japanese legislative efforts to date are not in keeping with
the spirit of the OECD Convention and are probably insufficient to meet the
Convention's standards.
BACKGROUND

II.

After a series of failed attempts to propagate international anti-bribery
legislation in the United Nations and the OECD, the United States has
achieved some measure of success with the November 1997 adoption of the
OECD Convention.
A History of FailedAttempts at InternationalBribery Legislation

A.

The United States has been promoting international anti-bribery
measures since 1979. On December 19, 1977, Congress passed the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), criminalizing payments to foreign
government officials by any U.S. corporation, U.S. citizen, or other entity
within Congress' federal jurisdiction.' 2 While most countries criminalize
the bribing of their own officials, the FCPA has, until quite recently, been
the only legislation in the world to criminalize the bribing of foreign
officials. 13 The United States has repeatedly tried to bring about
comprehensive international anti-bribery legislation in an attempt to keep4
American companies from being disadvantaged in international business.1
The first significant attempt at comprehensive international anti-bribery
legislation was in the United Nations ("U.N."), 15 when a draft U.N.
agreement entitled "International Agreement on Illicit Payments" was

:2

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1999) [hereinafter FCPA].

3 George, supra note 2, at 486.
4 Timothy Martin, Corruption And Improper Payments: Global Trends And Applicable Laws, 36
ALBERTA L. REv. 416, 428-29 (1998).
" Id. at 429.

212 .
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forwarded to the Council of the General Assembly in 1979.16 This attempt17
failed because of disagreements over the definition of an illicit payment,
and no action was ever taken in the General Assembly to conclude and
formalize the draft agreement.' 8 In 1981, the U.S. delegation petitioned the
OECD19 to implement an international illicit payments agreement; however,
this effort also failed.2 °
B.

The Structure of the OECD

The OECD is an organization of thirty member countries 2 1 "which
provides governments a setting in which to discuss, develop and perfect
economic and social policy. 22 The OECD's basic configuration consists of
committees of delegates and professional research activities, which are
coordinated by a Secretariat. 23 The committees are made up of delegates
from member countries, and they focus on committee specific policy
*
24
issues.
Committees are supported by "directorates," which are groups of
OECD staff comprised mostly of economists and lawyers with
corresponding academic specialties.25 The OECD is supported by annual
contributions of member countries, with
each member paying a share
26
proportionate to the size of its economy.
The governing body of OECD is the Council. The Council, composed
of one representative from each member country, determines the size of the
annual budget and OECD priorities. 27 All actions of the Council must
receive a unanimous vote by representatives of the member states.28 The
OECD working group that generated a convention or agreement will
generally monitor it.

16 id.

17 Jong Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention: Implications For
Global Efforts To Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ.245, 254-55 (2000).
Martin, supra note 14, at 429.
'9 See infra Part I.B for a description of the OECD.
20 Martin, supra note 14, at 429.
21 For a brief history of the OECD, see George, supra note 2, at 487-89. For current membership of
the OECD, see supra note 10.
22 OECD, ABOUT THE OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
23 Id.
24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.

id.
26 George, supra note 2, at 490.
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The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
InternationalBusiness

The United States achieved its goal of propagating international antibribery legislation with the adoption of the OECD Convention in 1997. The
impetus behind the OECD Convention can be found in Congress' 1988
amendments to the FCPA, which included language directing the President
to pursue international anti-bribery measures within the OECD.29 In 1989,
the U.S. representatives to the OECD attempted to initiate a multilateral
agreement against bribery. 30 Germany, France, Japan, and Spain openly
32
resisted this action. 31 In May 1994, due to international pressures and
33
politicking, the majority of the OECD countries agreed to endorse a nonbinding package of recommendations and "meaningful steps" entitled
OECD Recommendations on Bribery in International Business
Transactions.34 In May 1997, the OECD Committee reconvened to review
steps taken by member countries pursuant to the 1994 recommendations. 35
At this meeting, the United States delegation pressured the other members to
adopt a binding agreement prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.36 In
November 1997, the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.3 7 All the
members signed the OECD Convention, thereby committing themselves to
ratify and implement the OECD Convention in the form of domestic

legislation by December 31,

1999.38

29 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107,

1424, provides:
(1) Negotiations. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation
of an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts
prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this
section. Such international agreement should include a process by which problems and conflicts
associated with such acts could be resolved.
The President was then directed to make a detailed progress report within a year. FCPA, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 78dd-1 (1999).
30 George, supra note 2, at 495.
3' Some think that France and Germany resisted in an attempt to protect domestic laws which made
certain bribes tax deductible. See id. at 496.
32 George, supra note 2, at 497.
31 Id. at 496-97.
34 Martin, supra note 14, at 429.
35 Id.
36 Id.

37 George, supra note 2, at 500.
38 id.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

III.

VOL. I I No. I

THE OECD CONVENTION

By adopting the OECD Convention, member countries committed
themselves to promulgate domestic anti-bribery legislation according to the
Convention's principles. 39 Thus the Convention is not a template for
legislation, but rather a set of general guidelines that mandate broad
outcomes. 40 The OECD Convention sets forth minimum standards for
legislation, thus allowing each member country the flexibility to adopt
measures compatible with its own existing legal principles. 4'
A.

The Mandates of the OECD Convention

The OECD Convention sets forth minimum standards for legislation
by member countries.4 2 These mandates can be executed in a manner which
is consistent with a given member country's existing legal principles.43
1.

The Offense ofBribing a ForeignPublic Official

Parties to the Convention are required to promulgate laws that
establish a criminal offense for bribing officials of foreign countries." The
act of bribery is portrayed as the offer, promise, or gift of any undue 45 thing
of value to a foreign official for the purpose of influencing that official to act
or refrain from acting in their official capacity in such a way that an
improper business advantage is secured. 46 "Foreign public official" is
defined as:
[A]ny person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial
office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country,

39 Id.

40 OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
41 id.
42 id.
43 id.

4 OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, § 1.
45 Note that "undue" is not defined in the OECD Convention. See OECD Convention, supra note 9.
46 The exact language used in the convention is "to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business." OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, § 1.
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including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any
official or agent of a public international organization.47

Convention

The

further

mandates

that

parties

criminalize

50
49
complicity, 48 attempt, and conspiracy to commit such bribery. Parties to

the Convention are required to apply the anti-bribery provisions to legal as
well as natural persons. 51

Finally, parties to the Convention are directed to establish accounting
standards 52 that would hinder the ability of persons engaging in the bribery
of foreign officials from hiding such activities.53 Members are charged with
providing sanctions sufficient to deter accounting practices that violate these
standards.
2.

4

Required Sanctions

The fundamental requirement for sanctions to be in compliance with
dissuasive." 55
the Convention is that they be "effective, proportionate and
Member countries are instructed to punish the bribery of foreign officials in
a manner consistent with the punishment for the bribery of domestic
officials.56 Parties to the Convention are also directed to adopt measures that
assure that the bribe and the proceeds of bribery are subject to confiscation,
41 Id. art. 1, § 4(a).
48 "Complicity" is defined to include: incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorization of an act of

bribery of a foreign public official. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1,§ 2.
49 "Attempt" and "conspiracy" are not clearly defined in the OECD Convention. See OECD
Convention, supra note 9. However, in the Annex member countries are directed to incorporate their
relevant concepts of "attempt," "complicity," and "conspiracy": "The general criminal law concepts of
attempt, complicity and/or conspiracy of the law of the prosecuting state are recognised as applicable to the
offence of bribery of a foreign public official." Id. ann. § 2.
50 OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, § 2.
51 Id. (generally seen as referring to corporations). It should be noted that some countries, including
Japan, do not impose criminal liability on corporations. Corr & Lawler, supra note 4, at 1307. In light of
this, Article 3 mandates imposition of fines and penalties on corporations in such instances so as to
effectively sanction them as well. Id. at 1249, 1307.
52 Discussion of the accounting provisions is outside the scope of this Comment.
53 OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 8, § 1.
14 Id. art. 8, § 2.
" Id. art. 3, § l.
56 Id. The Annex directs member countries to provide:
Monetary or other civil, administrative or criminal penalties on any legal person involved,
should be provided, taking into account the amounts of the bribe and of the profits derived from
Forfeiture or confiscation of instrumentalities and
the transaction obtained through the bribe. ....
of the bribe benefits and the profits derived from the transactions obtained through the bribe
should be provided, or comparable fines or damages imposed.
Id. ann. § 5.
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or alternatively, are offset by a fine of equal or greater value. 57 Member
countries that have made bribery of domestic officials a predicate offense in
money laundering legislation are directed to extend such classification to
include bribery of foreign officials.58
Enforcement of the new bribery offense may occur in a manner59
congruent with the normal methods and procedures of member countries.
However, it is required that such procedures "shall not be influenced by
considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon
relations with
another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons
60
involved.,
3.

Necessary Scope and Jurisdiction

The OECD Convention mandates that member countries make
provisions to ensure jurisdiction and provide mutual legal assistance. Parties
to the Convention are directed to take measures to establish jurisdiction over
the bribery of a foreign public official on its soil or by its nationals abroad.6'
Member countries are required to make bribery of a foreign public official
an extraditable offense under their own laws and treaties, 62 and directed to
take steps to assure that they can extradite their nationals in such cases.63
Member countries are instructed to consult with each other in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction. 64 Parties to the Convention are also required, to the
fullest extent possible under existing treaties, to provide legal assistance to
other parties to the Convention in connection with investigations and
proceedings related to the bribery of foreign officials. 65 Member countries
are directed to make legal provisions for formal use of the Secretary-General
of the OECD as liaison for the purpose of consultations,
the rendering of
66
legal assistance, and extradition proceedings.

IId. art. 3, § 3.
IId. art. 7.
59 Id. art. 5. In other words, member countries are given the freedom to integrate this offense into
their existing enforcement scheme.
60 id.
61 Id. art. 4, §§ 1, 2.
62 Id. art. 10,§ 1.
63 Id. art. 10, § 2.
64 Id. art. 4, § 3.
65 Id. art.
9, § 1.
66 Id.art. 11.
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Monitoring and Follow-up

Parties to the Convention are required to "co-operate in carrying out a
programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full
67
This follow-up is to be done within
implementation of [the] Convention.,
the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions. The Working Group is composed of senior legal
experts from all member countries. 68 In accordance with Article 12 of the
OECD Convention, the Working Group has established systems of self and
mutual evaluation to ensure the effectiveness of steps taken by member
69
countries.
B.

Analysis of the OECD MandatedAnti-Bribery Provisions

While not perfect, the OECD Convention has the potential to address
the major concerns of the United States regarding the bribery of foreign
officials. The provisions of the OECD Convention are broad and sweeping,
70
but still provide strict guidelines to member nations. Although member
countries are required to reach certain outcomes, "national authorities [are
left with] with the choice of form and methods.'
However, the OECD Convention left certain key issues unresolved.
For example, it does not address bribe-taking or bribe-soliciting by officials
in non-member countries.7 Bribe-taking and bribe-soliciting are seen as
Since
"demand-side" issues,73 and the OECD deals with supply-side issues.
74
of the OECD to address,
power
the
outside
are
issues
demand-side
these
• in no way • changed •the75 culture of bribe-soliciting
the Convention has
prevalent in non-member developing countries. Indeed, in some countries,
receipt of bribes is considered to be part of the salary of poorly paid civil
servants. 76 These demand-side issues are critical. Despite the fact that the

67 Id. art. 12.
68 George, supra note 2, at 504.
69 Id. at 505.
go beyond what is mandated by the U.S. FCPA. See infra Part IV.
70 In some cases, the guidelines
71 George, supra note 2, at 499.
72 Id. at519.
73 For example, the soliciting and taking of a bribe is not covered in the OECD Convention.
74 The OECD is, after all, a non-governmental organization. It has no power to demand that nonmember sovereign states reformulate their laws.
75 George, supra note 2, at 519.
76 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 277-79 (1997).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. I1INo. I

OECD provisions cover all of the world's major industrial powers, 7 the
Convention creates a gap between the major industrial powers, whose
companies are now prohibited from making bribes, and lesser-developed
non-member countries, whose officials will likely still demand them.
Further, the Convention does not mandate the criminalization of
"grease payments," which are described by the OECD as "facilitation
payments made to induce public officials to perform functions part of their
routine duties. 78 Instead, such expenditures are carefully excluded from the
definition of illicit payment in the OECD Convention,79 and thus left outside
of the scope of the Convention. °
Possibly the most significant shortcoming in the OECD Convention,
however, is its failure to mandate the criminalization of bribery of foreign
political parties and candidates for foreign political office. 81 Foreign
business interference in party politics and elections is a serious issue, but
officers of political parties and candidates for office are not included in the
current definition of "foreign public official."82 This issue was to be
resolved by the OECD Committee in an expedited manner, but as of yet has
not been addressed. 3
These criticisms are perhaps premature, considering the scope and
intent of the Convention. Furthermore, the OECD activity in this area is not
likely to taper off any time soon. It may be more appropriate to look at the
1997 Convention as being the foundation for international accord regarding
the bribing of foreign officials, and consequently making further refinement
possible. Thus, the OECD Convention would, if implemented properly by
member countries, seem to accomplish the major goals of the United States
regarding the bribery of foreign officials.
IV.

AMERICAN RESPONSES

TO

INTERNATIONAL

BRIBERY:

THE

U.S.

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

The U.S. codification of laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials
is found in the FCPA. The FCPA was first promulgated on December 19,
77 George, supra note 2, at 519.
78 OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.oecd.org (last visited
Jan. 5,2001).
79 Kim, supra note 17, at 261.
80 It should be noted that the U.S. FCPA also carefully excludes the making of grease payments. See
supra Part IV.B.
81 Corr & Lawler, supra note 4, at 1305. The FCPA does criminalize the bribery of foreign
political
parties and candidates for foreign political office. See infra Part IV.B.3.
:2 See generally OECD Convention, supra note 9.
83 Corr & Lawler, supranote 4, at 1249, 1305.
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1977, in response to media exposure of a number of high profile
international bribery incidents.8 4 These scandals acted as a catalyst for the
creation and passage of the FCPA.85 When it was passed, the United States
became the first country in the world to criminalize the bribing of foreign
officials. 86 The FCPA, as it pertains to the crime of bribing a foreign
official, 87 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and 78dd-2, and has only been
amended twice since its passage in 1977. In 1988, it was amended to
provide two affirmative defenses. 88 In 1998, the FCPA was amended again,
this time with the intent of bringing it into compliance with the OECD
Convention. 89 Thus, the FCPA has been a stable and accepted part of
American criminal law for over twenty years. As such, it is a useful tool for
understanding the OECD Convention mandates, as well as for evaluating
Japan's attempts at compliance.
A.

The Provisions of the FCPA

1.

The Offense of Bribing a Foreign Public Official

The FCPA criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials. The
FCPA makes it a federal crime "for any U.S. person or entity to offer or to
pay, either directly or through an intermediary, anything of value to a
foreign government official in order to gain an improper commercial
advantage in obtaining or retaining business." 90
It is a federal offense for subject entities to make payments91 to any of
the following entities: 1) a foreign official,92 2) a foreign political party [or
'

These scandals included large payments by Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, and Lockheed to the officials of

major trading partners. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 4, at 1256 (detailing scandals).
85 Id.

George, supra note 2, at 486.
8' In addition to criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials, the FCPA set forth new accounting
standards designed to make such practices harder to hide. Note that the FCPA's accounting provisions were
modified and incorporated into the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEA") of 1934. Discussion of the
accounting provisions are outside of the scope of this Comment, and thus reference to the FCPA in this
:6

which criminalize the bribing of
Comment should be understood to refer only to the portion of the acts
foreign officials.
Corr & Lawler, supra note 4, at 1256. See infra Part IV.A.1.
89 Corr & Lawler, supra note 4, at 1258.
'o Id. at 1257.
91 The language of the statute is as follows: "Make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value."
FCPA, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(a) (1999).
2 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(a)(l). "Foreign official" is defined to mean any officer or employee of a
foreign govenment or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
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official thereof] or any candidate for foreign political office, 93 or 3) any

person while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to an entity
described in 1) or 2) above.94 Such a payment, to be criminal, must be made
by the issuer or its agent with the intent of:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in
his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such
official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a
foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining
95
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
The FCPA prohibitions do not apply to payments made to one of the
above enumerated entities "which [are] to expedite or to secure the
performance of a routine governmental action." 96 This would seem to
encompass the making of grease payments to officials
of foreign
97
governments in order to motivate them to do their jobs.
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.

15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A).
9 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(a)(2).
9' 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(a)(3).
"
15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l), (a)(2), (a)(3).
' 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(b).
97 "Routine governmental action" is defined to mean:
only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in:
(i)
obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do
business in a foreign country;
(ii)
processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across
country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
actions of a similar nature.
The term "routine governmental action" does not include any decision by a foreign official
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular
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Additionally, the 1988 amendments created two affirmative defenses
to charges of bribing foreign public officials. Section 78dd-l(c)(1) tolerates
payments made in a manner lawful under the written laws of the country in
question; 98 i.e., it is a valid defense to show compliance with foreign laws
Section 78dd-1(c)(2) allows reasonable
when making a payment.
expenditures99 directly related to the promotion of products and services, or
the performance of a contract. 00
2.

Sanctions

Sanctions under the FCPA are formidable. Domestic concerns 01 that
are not natural persons are subject to fines up to $2,000,000, and civil
penalties up to $10,000.1 02 Natural persons who are officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of domestic concerns
are subject to fines up to $100,000, and civil penalties up to $10,000.'0'
Additionally, under other federal statutes, "any person" may be fined up to
twice the pecuniary04gain of the offense or twice the loss to a person other
than the defendant.'
The FCPA authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctions against
covered entities currently engaged in or are about to engage in prohibited
acts. 105 The section also makes provisions for the Attorney General to
The Attorney General is directed to
conduct discovery and go to trial.
issue guidelines, advisory opinions, and precautionary procedures to assist
businesses to comply with the FCPA. 1° 7

party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision making process to
encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party.
15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(f)(3).
9' FCPA, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(c)(1).
99 Examples given in the statute are travel and lodging expenses incurred to promote one's product or
service. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
:Do15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B).
101Defined infra, Part IV.A.3.
102 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(g)(1).
"0 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(g)(2).
1997
4 OECD, UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Compliance].
'0' 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(d).
"6 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(c).
107 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-l(d).
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Scope and Jurisdiction

The FCPA attempts to regulate the vast majority of U.S. persons and
entities. The crime of bribing a foreign official pertains to corporations who
issue stock, and their employees, 0 8 and any "domestic concern" defined as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of
the United States; and
(B)
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock
company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the
United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of
the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States. 0 9
The 1998 amendments added § 78dd-l(g), presumably to bring the
FCPA into accord with the OECD Convention. The new section sets forth
an offense similar to that described above, but without a jurisdictional hook
requiring the use of the mails or interstate commerce. It is seen as acquiring
jurisdiction over foreign nationals and foreign businesses when they enter
the United States to take an action in furtherance of a bribe overseas, as the
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirements are satisfied when such an
entity enters the U.S. "10
B.

Analysis-The Mandates of the OECD Convention and the FCPA

The OECD Convention and the FCPA aim at, and generally achieve,
very similar results: the systematic criminalization of the act of bribing
foreign public officials. Only minor amendments were necessary to bring
the United States into compliance with the Convention, and only two
differences of any significance remain between the required outcomes of the
Convention and the FCPA. The FCPA includes within the scope of criminal
activity the bribery of political parties and candidates for office, while the
OECD does not. This is a significant difference, but likely to be remedied in

§ 78dd-l(a).
'09 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).
110U.S. Compliance, supra note 104. Other country specific compliance reports are also available at
'a' 15 U.S.C.S.

http://www.oecd.org.
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the future. "' The FCPA allows the affirmative defense of reasonable
expenditure while the OECD does not. This may well not be an issue since
the U.S. authorities have investigated has fallen
"to date, no payment that
'12
within this exception."

V.

OECD CONVENTION AND JAPAN'S AMENDMENTS TO THE UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW
THE

On September 18, 1998, Japan attempted to implement the OECD
Convention by amending the Unfair Competition Prevention Law ("UCPL")
to include the offense of bribing a foreign public official. 1 3 As no official
translation is available, this Comment references the unofficial translation
provided to the OECD by the Japanese delegation.
A.

The UCPL Amendments Adopted for OECD Compliance

1.

The Offense ofBribing a ForeignPublic Official

The UCPL criminalizes the completed act of bribing a foreign public
official. The new UCPL provisions state, "No one may give, offer or
promise any undue pecuniary or other advantage, to a foreign public official,
in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties . . . in order to obtain improper business
advantage."' " 4 It is critical to note that a crime has been committed only in
cases of a completed bribe," 5 thus it is not a crime to conspire or attempt
such action.
A public official is defined to include any person who: engages in
public service for a national or a local government in a foreign country,
works for a business owned or controlled by a foreign government, engages
in public service for an international organization, or exercises a public
competence of a national or a local
function, which belongs to the authorized
!
government in a foreign country. 16

. See supra Part III.C.
112 U.S. Compliance, supra note 104.
113 OECD, JAPAN: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION,

http://www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Japan Compliance].
":4 Unfair Competition Prevention Law, Law No. 47 (1993) (Japan) [hereinafter UCPL No. 471.
115 Japan Compliance, supra note 113.
116UCPL No. 47, supra note 114, art. 13.
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Sanctions

Sanctions under the UCPL are moderate. Natural persons who violate
the new law can be fined up to V 3,000,000 (approximately $24,400)"' and
imprisoned for up to three years. 1 8 Juridical persons" 9 can be fined up to
V300,000,000 (approximately $2,440,000). 120 Confiscation of funds is
limited to the bribe itself-the proceeds of active bribery are not subject to
forfeiture.'21
3.

Scope and Jurisdiction

The UCPL prohibition against bribing foreign public officials is seen
as extending to natural and juridical persons, but contains significant
exceptions. 122 For example, Article 10 bis-(3) presents a significant
exception to the new crime. Conduct otherwise amounting to an offense will
not violate the UCPL when the main office of the entity giving the bribe is
situated in the same country in which the foreign public official in question
is employed in public service. 123 This exception would seem to apply
regardless of where the act of bribery occurs. 24 Exactly what constitutes an
entity's main office is not defined in the statute. 125 However, Japanese
authorities believe that such determinations will probably follow decisions in
relation to the definition of "head office" under the Commercial Code,
wherein the "head office" is an office that acts as the center of management
of the entity's business. 126 Thus:
In the case where a division of a Japanese corporation is located in a
foreign country, the "main office" would usually be considered to be
in Japan. [However,] the "main office" of a subsidiary of a Japanese

17 All currency conversions in this Comment were done on Nov. 4, 2001, at a rate of $1 = Y122.858.
Currency was converted using xe.com's Universal Currency Converter, available at http://www.xe.

com/ucc/.
"a UCPL No. 47, supra note 114, art. 10. bis-(2).
19 "Juridical person" is seen as referring to incorporated entities,
Compliance, supra note 113.
120 UCPL No. 47, supra note 114, arts. 13, 14.
121Japan Compliance, supra note 113.
122 Id. art. 10 bis-(3).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. § 4.1.

i.e. corporations.

Japan
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country would usually be determined
corporation located in a foreign
27
to be in the foreign country.
As a result, a Japanese citizen living in Japan, but employed by a subsidiary
of a Japanese company, which is determined to have a head office
officials on behalf of the subsidiary without
elsewhere, can bribe foreign
28
running afoul of the law.1
B.

Analysis of the New Japanese Crime of the Bribery of a Foreign
Public Official

The newly adopted amendments to Japan's UCPL would seem to fall
short of the spirit and the mandates of the OECD Convention on a number of
critical issues. These shortcomings fall into three categories: 1) the scope of
the anti-bribery crime, 2) the sanctions for the anti-bribery crime, and 3) the
status/positioning of the new offense in relation to other crimes within the
body of Japanese statutes.
1.

Issues of the Offense and Its Scope

Japan's amendments to the UCPL fall short in its definition of the
crime itself and in its exceptions. In Japan, the crime of bribing a foreign
official does not include an attempt to bribe a foreign official. 129 The OECD
mandates that "attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall
be criminal offenses to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a
public official of that Party."' 30 As Japan's penal code does not criminalize
attempts to bribe domestic officials, the new legislation is technically within
the accepted bounds of the OECD Convention. OECD reviewers present the
following scenario to illustrate the gap this creates in the new crime:
"Where a corporate executive authorizes his/her subordinate to pay a bribe
and the subordinate neither pays, promises nor offers ' the
3 advantage, neither
the executive nor the subordinate could be punished."' '
Also troubling is the "main office" exemption created by Article 10
bis-(3), 132 which exempts otherwise criminal acts when the main office of
127 Japan Compliance, supra note 113.
28 Id.
129 See supra Part V.A.1.

30 OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, § 2.
131 Japan Compliance, supra note 113.
132See supra Part V.A.3.
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the entity giving the bribe is situated in the same country in which the
foreign public official in question is employed in public service. According
to the Working Group responsible for monitoring Japan's compliance with
in the UCPL
the OECD Convention: "the 'main office' exception ' contained
33
is inconsistent with the standards of the Convention.
Issues of Sanction

2.

The sanctions provided in the UCPL amendments are probably too
weak to effectively dissuade corporations from bribing foreign public
officials. 134 The offense of bribing a foreign public official is punished
primarily by fines, with the additional possibility of up to three years in
prison if the offender is a natural person. Natural persons can be fined a
maximum of Y3,000,000 (approximately $2440). Corporations can be fined
a maximum of Y300,000,000 (approximately $2,440,000). 135 Seizure or
confiscation of the proceeds of bribery is not available under the Japanese
legislation. The OECD Working Group postulated that, given the financial
stakes involved in international business deals, such a relatively small fine
might well be considered just a cost of doing business by immensely
wealthy Japanese corporations. 136 Consequently, a Japanese corporation
could rest assured that the comparatively small penalty assessed would be
foreign public official-any gains from this
the only cost of bribing a 137
activity would remain intact.
The Japanese delegates to the OECD Convention contend that a
criminal conviction for bribing a foreign public official would be a magnet
for negative media attention that would do additional damage to an
offending company. 138 While this may be true, the Working Group
concluded: "The UCPL, which provides for limited criminal fines and does
133 Japan Compliance, supra note 113.

34 Id. § 2.1. The language of the working group is straight-forward:
The Working Group does not consider the sanctions available for legal persons to be
sufficiently effective, proportionate and dissuasive in view of the large size of many of its
corporations, particularly since seizure and confiscation (as noted below) are not available
under the Japanese legislation. It welcomes the opinion of the Japanese authorities that the
stigma of a conviction would create significant losses for a corporation, but nevertheless
recommends that Japan consider raising the maximum fine for legal persons.

Id.
135 Id.
136

Id.

137 Id.
139 Id.
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the proceeds of bribery, does not meet the
not provide for confiscation ' of
139
Convention.
the
of
standards
3.

Issues of Status within JapaneseLaw

The amendments to the UCPL seem only to be concerned with the
Japanese markets.' 40 This significant shortcoming is demonstrated by the
location of the amendments in the Japanese laws. 141 When codified, the new
crime of bribing a foreign official was grafted into the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law-not the Japanese Penal Code, which contains the domestic
bribery offenses. The purpose of the UCPL is set forth in Article 1:
The purpose of this Law is, by providing for measures for the
prevention of, and compensation for damages from unfair
competition, etc. in order to ensure fair competition among
entrepreneurs and the full implementation of international
agreements related thereto, and thereby to contribute to the
development of the national economy (emphasis
wholesome
4
added).1 1
Thus, the purpose of the UCPL is to prevent unfair competition in the
Japanese market-no such concerns are expressed for the global market.
Consequently, it is unclear whether bribery offenses affecting only foreign
markets would be prosecuted. 143 This attitude is reflected in the "main
office" exemption, which excuses otherwise criminal acts when the main
office of the entity giving the bribe is situated in the same country in which
the foreign public official in question is employed. This exception indicates
a desire by the Japanese to ignore problems outside of their country, even in
144
some cases where the actors are Japanese citizens.
In sum, the new Japanese crime of bribing a foreign public official is
notably weaker than what is mandated by the OECD Convention. It falls
short both in terms of the scope of what activities are deemed criminal and
the sanctions for those activities. However, most troubling is the possibility
139 id.

140Id. § A.
141See id.
142UCPL No. 47, supra note 114.
143Japan Compliance, supra note 113.
144Recall that a Japanese citizen living in Japan, but employed by a subsidiary of a Japanese
company with a head office elsewhere can bribe foreign officials on behalf of the subsidiary without
running afoul of the law. See Part V.A.3.
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that instances of bribery of foreign public officials will go unpunished if
they do not affect the Japanese market.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A.

The Spirit of the OECD Convention-A Comparison Between the New
JapaneseProvisionsand the U.S. FCPA

The preamble of the OECD Convention makes a number of strong
statements about the purposes and goals of the convention. Bribery is found
to be a widespread and immoral activity that "undermines good governance
and economic development."1 45 The parties state that "all countries share a
responsibility to combat bribery in international business transactions." 46
The U.S. Congress pursued substantially similar goals when it passed the
FCPA in 1977, putting American companies at a competitive disadvantage
during the intervening twenty-four years. The FCPA has a greater scope
than mandated by the OECD Convention as it reaches bribery of foreign
political parties and candidates for foreign office. 14 7 It also makes possible
the assessment of enormous sanctions upon offenders-up to two times the
delinquent's pecuniary gain.
Japan's recent efforts stand in stark contrast to the U.S. FCPA. The
amendments to the UCPL are not in keeping with the spirit of the OECD
Convention. Whereas the OECD Convention is intended to combat global
bribery in business transactions, the Japanese statute seems only to be
concerned with Japanese markets. Japan appears willing to allow bribery on
its soil so long as its own markets are not affected. In addition, the sanctions
for such activity are arguably too small to deter companies from bribing
foreign officials when the stakes are high.
B.

The New CompetitivePosition ofAmerican Interests vis-a-vis JapanA PossibleScenario

With the above analysis in place it is not hard to imagine a scenario as
follows, if one assumes: 1) the corporations are rational, non-moral actors
who look only to the letter of the law as boundaries to their actions, and 2)
the corporations will take the action most likely to yield the highest profit.
For example, two large automobile manufacturers, one American and one
45 OECD Convention, supra note 9, pmbl.
id.
147 See supra Part IV.A.1.
146
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Japanese, are competing for a contract to provide a large number of vehicles
to the government of a developing country. 148 This is a large contract and
both companies want it because of relatively slow domestic sales brought on
by an economic recession. Key government officials of the developing
country indicate receptivity to a little something under the table, and hint
that it will strongly influence which company is awarded the contract.
The corporations, as profit-maximizing rational actors, would factor in
the likelihood of actually being caught and punished as part of a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether or not to tender an illegal payment. Three
issues would figure prominently: 1) the likelihood of getting caught, 2) the
likelihood of being convicted, and 3) the consequences of conviction.
Let us further assume that the likelihood of discovery is quite high for
a bribe of any substantial amount due to the accounting requirements of the
OECD Convention.
The American company would look to the FCPA-a longstanding,
stable part of the American criminal law-and the record of successful
prosecutions for FCPA violations. Faced with the possibility of fines two
times the amount of any pecuniary gain from bribery, a rational actor would
not engage in bribery.
In contrast, the Japanese company would first ask if the expected
profit from the contract exceeded Y300,000,000, the maximum fine for
conviction of bribing a foreign public official under the Japanese UCPL. If
so, there would be no reason not to engage in bribery, except for the
possibility of negative media attention in the event of a conviction for
bribery. The company would at this point factor in the possibility of not
being prosecuted at all because the bribery had no effect on the Japanese
market. In the case of a lucrative contract, the only real danger to the
Japanese company is negative press. A rational actor would only have to
weigh how much the possibility of negative press was worth when compared
to the guarantee of X amount of profit.
This scenario illustrates that on average, assuming the current level of
legislation, Japanese companies have an advantage in international business:
they have retained the ability to bribe foreign officials in a cost-effective
manner, and thus increased their competitive position.
In conclusion, the FCPA is an established deterrent, effectively
preventing the bribing of foreign officials by American companies. It
complies fully with the mandates of the OECD Convention. In contrast, the
UCPL is a questionable deterrent, which may not prevent the bribing of
"8 This scenario falls clearly within the scope of the OECD Convention's intended reach.
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foreign officials by Japanese companies. It probably does not comply with
the OECD Convention.
Due to this discrepancy, it would seem that
American companies still suffer a potential disadvantage when competing
with Japanese companies in international business.

